Crimes de perigo abstrato e ofensividade: parâmetros para sua utilização constitucional para a proteção de bens jurídicos
Nenhuma Miniatura disponível
Data
2022-12-13
Tipo de documento
Monografia
Título da Revista
ISSN da Revista
Título de Volume
Área do conhecimento
Ciências Sociais Aplicadas
Modalidade de acesso
Acesso aberto
Editora
Autores
Oliveira, Lucimara Aparecida Silva Antunes de
Orientador
Lopes, Luciano Santos
Coorientador
Resumo
O Direito Penal tradicional volta-se, em regra, para a repressão de condutas lesivas a bens jurídicos individuais ou individualizáveis. Com o surgimento ou o reconhecimento de valores que transcendem o indivíduo, o Direito Penal passa a cuidar da prevenção de danos contra esses bens, o que ensejou a sua expansão para áreas que até então eram tratadas na órbita civil ou administrativa, o que fez surgir um espaço de regulação coercitiva que gravita entre os diversos ramos do Direito. O Direito Penal atua nesse contexto por meio de crimes de perigo abstrato, o que ocasiona por vezes a sua administrativização. Surge então o questionamento: quais são os parâmetros a serem observados pelo legislador para o uso dos tipos de perigo forma constitucional? Para responder ao questionamento, parte-se da hipótese de que a tipificação de condutas abstratamente perigosas será constitucional quando não se tratar de coerção para o cumprimento de deveres para com a Administração e quando o Direito Penal não for usado como sucedâneo de normas administrativas oriundas da função administrativa ordinária. Para atender ao proposto, analisa-se o tipo penal, constatando-se que nele deve conter o bem jurídico, a descrição do perigo não permitido e a ofensividade. Objetiva-se ainda a análise do tipo penal constituído pelo bem jurídico e pela ofensividade bem como dos crimes de perigo abstrato. Com o fim apresentar a linha divisória entre os crimes de perigo abstrato e a administrativização do Direito Penal, faz-se um estudo do artigo 51 da Lei 9.605 de 1998 o que possibilitou apresentar alguns parâmetros para tipificação de condutas como crimes de perigo abstrato de forma legítima. O estudo é feito à luz do funcionalismo teleológico teorizado por Claus Roxin, cuja principal contribuição foi a introdução de valores político-criminais na teoria do delito, tendo-se como função primordial do Direito Penal a proteção de bens jurídicos de forma subsidiária. Pelo método hipotético-dedutivo e por análise doutrinária, bem como com a comparação entre alguns dispositivos legais, foi possível confirmar a solução hipotética como adequada, ou seja, os crimes de perigo abstrato são compatíveis com a Constituição quando forem alicerçados na proteção de bens jurídicos e contiverem a ofensividade na descrição da conduta, não podendo ser utilizados como meio para o cumprimento de normas administrativas, uma vez que a função administrativa não constitui um como bem jurídico-penal.
ABSTRACT As a rule, traditional criminal law focuses on the repression of conducts that harm individual or individualized legal assets. With the emergence or recognition of values that transcend the individual, criminal law is now concerned with the prevention of damage to these goods, which has led to its expansion to areas that were previously dealt with in the civil or administrative sphere, creating an area of coercive regulation that gravitates between the various branches of law. Criminal Law acts in this context through crimes of abstract danger, which sometimes leads to its administrativeization. The question then arises: what are the parameters to be observed by the legislator for the use of the types of danger in a constitutional way? To answer the question, we start from the hypothesis that the typification of abstractly dangerous conduct will be constitutional when it is not coercion for the fulfillment of duties to the Administration and when the criminal law is not used as a substitute for administrative rules arising from the ordinary administrative function. In order to meet the proposal, the criminal type is analyzed, noting that it must contain the legal asset, the description of the non-permissible danger and the offensiveness. The objective is also to analyze the criminal type constituted by the legal asset and the offensiveness, as well as the crimes of abstract danger. In order to present the dividing line between crimes of abstract danger and the administrativeization of Criminal Law, a study of article 51 of Law 9.605 of 1998 is made, which made possible to present some parameters for the typification of conducts as crimes of abstract danger in a legitimate way. The study is made in the light of the teleological functionalism theorized by Claus Roxin, whose main contribution was the introduction of political-criminal values in the theory of crime, having as its primary function of criminal law the protection of legal assets in a subsidiary way. By the hypothetical-deductive method and by doctrinal analysis, as well as with the comparison between some legal provisions, it was possible to confirm the hypothetical solution as adequate, that is, crimes of abstract danger are compatible with the Constitution when they are based on the protection of legal assets and contain the offensiveness in the description of the conduct, and cannot be used as a means for the enforcement of administrative rules, since the administrative function does not constitute a legal-penal assets.
ABSTRACT As a rule, traditional criminal law focuses on the repression of conducts that harm individual or individualized legal assets. With the emergence or recognition of values that transcend the individual, criminal law is now concerned with the prevention of damage to these goods, which has led to its expansion to areas that were previously dealt with in the civil or administrative sphere, creating an area of coercive regulation that gravitates between the various branches of law. Criminal Law acts in this context through crimes of abstract danger, which sometimes leads to its administrativeization. The question then arises: what are the parameters to be observed by the legislator for the use of the types of danger in a constitutional way? To answer the question, we start from the hypothesis that the typification of abstractly dangerous conduct will be constitutional when it is not coercion for the fulfillment of duties to the Administration and when the criminal law is not used as a substitute for administrative rules arising from the ordinary administrative function. In order to meet the proposal, the criminal type is analyzed, noting that it must contain the legal asset, the description of the non-permissible danger and the offensiveness. The objective is also to analyze the criminal type constituted by the legal asset and the offensiveness, as well as the crimes of abstract danger. In order to present the dividing line between crimes of abstract danger and the administrativeization of Criminal Law, a study of article 51 of Law 9.605 of 1998 is made, which made possible to present some parameters for the typification of conducts as crimes of abstract danger in a legitimate way. The study is made in the light of the teleological functionalism theorized by Claus Roxin, whose main contribution was the introduction of political-criminal values in the theory of crime, having as its primary function of criminal law the protection of legal assets in a subsidiary way. By the hypothetical-deductive method and by doctrinal analysis, as well as with the comparison between some legal provisions, it was possible to confirm the hypothetical solution as adequate, that is, crimes of abstract danger are compatible with the Constitution when they are based on the protection of legal assets and contain the offensiveness in the description of the conduct, and cannot be used as a means for the enforcement of administrative rules, since the administrative function does not constitute a legal-penal assets.
Palavras-chave
Crime de perigo abstrato, Ofensividade, Bem jurídico, Administrativização do Direito Penal, Assessoriedade administrativa